Country: Hungary

Years: 1945-1954

Leader: Matyas Rakosi

Ideology: left

Description: CHISOLS identifies Rakosi’s party affiliation as MKP - or Hungarian Communist Party which merged to become the Hungarian Working People’s Party in 1948 - from 1945 to 1953 and as MDP from 1953 to 1954. Manzano (2017) identifies ideology as leftist. Perspective Monde (2019) identifies Rakosi’s ideology as leftist. Lentz (1994: 367) identifies Rakosi’s ideology as leftist, writing that “[Rakosi] became active in the Bolshevik movement after meeting Lenin during the Russian Revolution.” Döring and Manow (2019) identify MSzMP’s party family as communist/socialist.

Years: 1956-1987

Leader: Janos Kadar

Ideology: left

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies party as MSzMP, or Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party (HSWP). DPI identifies HSWP’s ideology as leftist. Armingeon et al. (2019) identifies MSzMP as leftist. Political Handbook of the World (2005-2006: 494), however, writes that “the 1962 congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (*Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt*—MSzMP) marked the beginning of a trend toward pragmatism in domestic policy that was exemplified by the implementation of a program known as the New Economic Mechanism, which allowed for decentralization, more flexible management strategies, incentives for efficiency, and expanded production of consumer goods” and that “at an extraordinary party congress on October 6–10, 1989, the party renounced Marxism”. Perspective Monde (2019) identifies Kadar’s ideology as leftist. Lentz (1994: 368) identifies Kadar’s ideology as leftist, writing that “[Kadar] worked in the communist underground.” In the Global Party Survey 2019, 14 experts identify the average left-right (0-10) score of the Hungarian Socialist Party – Dialogue for Hungary (MSZP-PM) as 3.8. Döring and Manow (2019) identify MSzMP’s party family as communist/socialist. In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify leader party’s ideology as “Far-left” (-4.196) in 1971, “Far-left” (-4.196) in 1975, “Far-left” (-4.196) in 1980, and “Far-left” (-4.196) in 1985.

Year: 1988

Leader: Karoly Grosz

Ideology: left

Description: Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies party as MSzMP, or Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party (HSWP). DPI identifies HSWP’s ideology as leftist. Armingeon et al. (2019) identifies MSzMP as leftist. Political Handbook of the World (2005-2006: 494), however, writes that “the 1962 congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (*Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt*—MSzMP) marked the beginning of a trend toward pragmatism in domestic policy that was exemplified by the implementation of a program known as the New Economic Mechanism, which allowed for decentralization, more flexible management strategies, incentives for efficiency, and expanded production of consumer goods” and that “at an extraordinary party congress on October 6–10, 1989, the party renounced Marxism”. Perspective Monde (2019) identifies Grosz’s ideology as leftist. Lentz (1994: 371) identifies Grosz’s ideology as leftist, writing that “Grosz joined with other hard-line communists to launch the Janos Kadar Society.” In the Global Party Survey 2019, 14 experts identify the average left-right (0-10) score of the Hungarian Socialist Party – Dialogue for Hungary (MSZP-PM) as 3.8. Döring and Manow (2019) identify MSzMP’s party family as communist/socialist. In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify leader party’s ideology as “Far-left” (-4.196) in 1985.

Year: 1989

Leader: Matyas Szuros

Ideology: left

Description: CHISOLS identifies Szuro’s party as MSZP. DPI identifies MSZP’s ideology as leftist. Armingeon et al. (2019) identifies MSzMP as leftist. Political Handbook of the World (2005-2006: 494), however, writes that “the 1962 congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (*Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt*—MSzMP) marked the beginning of a trend toward pragmatism in domestic policy that was exemplified by the implementation of a program known as the New Economic Mechanism, which allowed for decentralization, more flexible management strategies, incentives for efficiency, and expanded production of consumer goods” and that “at an extraordinary party congress on October 6–10, 1989, the party renounced Marxism”. Perspective Monde (2019) identifies Szuros’s ideology as leftist. In the Global Party Survey 2019, 14 experts identify the average left-right (0-10) score of the Hungarian Socialist Party – Dialogue for Hungary (MSZP-PM) as 3.8. Döring and Manow (2019) identify MSzP’s party family as social democracy. In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify leader party’s ideology as “Far-left” (-4.196) in 1985.

Years: 1990-1992

Leader: Jozsef Antall

Ideology: right

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies party as MDF. DPI identifies MDF’s ideology as rightist. Armingeon et al. (2019) identifies MDF as rightist. Political Handbook of the World (2015: 623) elaborates, writing that “the election notably saw the weakening … of the established liberal MDF”. Perspective Monde (2019) identifies Antall’s ideology as rightist. Döring and Manow (2019) identify MDF’s party family as conservative. In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify leader party’s ideology as “Center” (0.508) in 1990. In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify leader party’s cohesion as “A high level of visible disagreement” in 1990.

Year: 1993

Leader: Peter Boross

Ideology: right

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies party as MDF. DPI identifies MDF’s ideology as rightist. Armingeon et al. (2019) identifies MDF as rightist. Political Handbook of the World (2015: 623) elaborates, writing that “the election notably saw the weakening … of the established liberal MDF”. Perspective Monde (2019) identifies Boross’s ideology as rightist. Döring and Manow (2019) identify MDF’s party family as conservative. In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify leader party’s ideology as “Center” (0.508) in 1990. In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify leader party’s cohesion as “A high level of visible disagreement” in 1990.

Years: 1994-1997

Leader: Gyula Horn

Ideology: left

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies party as MSzP. DPI identifies MSzP’s ideology as leftist. Armingeon et al. (2019) identifies MSzMP as leftist. Political Handbook of the World (2005-2006: 494), however, writes that “the 1962 congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (*Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt*—MSzMP) marked the beginning of a trend toward pragmatism in domestic policy that was exemplified by the implementation of a program known as the New Economic Mechanism, which allowed for decentralization, more flexible management strategies, incentives for efficiency, and expanded production of consumer goods” and that “at an extraordinary party congress on October 6–10, 1989, the party renounced Marxism”. Perspective Monde (2019) identifies Horn’s ideology as leftist. In the Global Party Survey 2019, 14 experts identify the average left-right (0-10) score of the Hungarian Socialist Party – Dialogue for Hungary (MSZP-PM) as 3.8. Döring and Manow (2019) identify MSzP’s party family as social democracy. In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify leader party’s ideology as “Left” (-1.645) in 1994.

Years: 1998-2001

Leader: Viktor Orban

Ideology: leftist

Description: Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies party as Fidesz. DPI identifies Fidesz’s ideology as leftist. Armingeon et al. (2019) identifies Fidesz as rightist. Political Handbook of the World (2005-2006: 498), however, identifies Fidesz as rightist, writing that “founded in 1988, the right-wing group then styled simply as the Federation of Young Democrats (FiDeSz) ran fifth in the 1990 parliamentary balloting”. Perspective Monde (2019) identifies Orban’s ideology as rightist. In the Global Party Survey 2019, 14 experts identify the average left-right (0-10) score of Fidesz as 2.7. Norris (2020: 15) identifies Fidesz as leftist, writing that “parties using populist rhetoric fall across the economic spectrum, for example, Poland’s Law and Justice party (in common with many Eastern European populist parties) is socialist towards the economy and welfare state but highly traditional in its social values, for example towards Christianity, homosexuality and immigrants, alongside Bulgaria’s United Patriots and Hungary’s Fidesz”. Döring and Manow (2019) identify Fidesz-MPSz’s party family as conservative. Hass (2006: 566) writes that “In preparation for the 1994 elections, party leaders tried to re-create the party’s ideological platform, leading to a split between pro-market reformers (headed by Viktor Orban) and another group of reformers (headed by Gabor Fodor) who preferred a balance between market reforms and economic and social justice. After the split, in which Orban successfully gained control to define the party platform,” he “replaced the party’s initial liberal ideology with right-wing conservatism, more nation-alism, and occasional Christian themes, tapping into the rising wave of right-wing nationalist sentiments that spread through segments of Eastern European populations toward the end of the 1990s.” Quoting *The Economist*, Jeffries (2002: 209) writes that “Viktor Orban, who seemed a thorough-going liberal until he took on a populist tinge in order to broaden his party’s appeal, has promised to slash taxes, bolster welfare and make the economy grow by 7 percent.” Djankov (2015: 8) writes that “Viktor Orbán, now in his third term, shares many features with Russian president Vladimir Putin. Both view the increasing role of the state as beneficial for their economies. And both consider the Western European economic model to be flawed.” Körösényi & Patkós (2017) write that “Both [Orban and Berlusconi] reject egalitarianism and the social welfare policies of the left, and their governments have contributed to some extent to reducing the welfare state. The middle class and the upper-middle class are the beneficiaries of their economic and social policies. Tax cuts, fighting unemployment and creating new jobs are among the top priorities of both leaders’ electoral programs. … Orbán condemns free market liberalism, globalized capitalism and multinational financial institutions. From 2010 onwards he promoted policy which gives a strong role to the state in the economy, including massive state ownership in sectors like energy, telecommunication and public utilities. In Orbán’s view, both individuals and the state are responsible for individual well-being. For instance, in employment policy he prefers community service to aid for the unemployed, but claims that it is the responsibility of the state to provide work for everybody (after 2010 the Orbán cabinet introduced a massive community service program). From 2010 onwards Orbán became a champion of a ‘workfare state’ and full employment instead of a welfare state, and he favors marked state intervention in the economy. … Orbán’s policy of strong state intervention in the economy aims at, among other things, replacing the post-communist elite and reinforcing the new counter-elite.” Deak (2014: 159-160) writes that “in the field of economy Orbán had an extremely high number of past populist promises … Accordingly, he excluded the words “austerity” and “reform” from the conservative economic vocabulary, and at least at the beginning of his period tried to do things differently. The basic pattern of Orbán’s economic mindset was neoconservative in redistribution issues: the introduction of an income tax rate (one the most unpopular measures according to opinion polls), liberalization of the labor market and tightening the eligibility to social benefits. … Despite some of these neoconservative features Fidesz has a good deal of statist and anti-capitalist attitudes. Its ambitions to take over the commanding heights of the economy are very strong. ... [Fidesz] wanted to create a national bourgeoisie and, in parallel fashion, nationalize most of these sectors or at least strengthen the presence of the state. is economic nationalism and statism was coupled with the strong belief in dirigisme, i.e. that the state can optimally develop the national economy and contribute to economic growth." In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify leader party’s ideology as “Center-right” (0.702) in 1998. In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify leader party’s cohesion as “Virtually no visible disagreement” in 1998. Funke et. Al (2020) code Orban as “right-wing populist,” although profile states, “[Orban’s] ethnic-cultural focus and the frequent attacks on foreign elites play a far bigger role in his discourse than economic grievances.”

Years: 2002-2003

Leader: Peter Medgyessy

Ideology: left

Description: Description: Description: Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies party as MSzP. DPI identifies MSzP’s ideology as leftist. Armingeon et al. (2019) identifies MSzMP as leftist. Political Handbook of the World (2005-2006: 494), however, writes that “the 1962 congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (*Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt*—MSzMP) marked the beginning of a trend toward pragmatism in domestic policy that was exemplified by the implementation of a program known as the New Economic Mechanism, which allowed for decentralization, more flexible management strategies, incentives for efficiency, and expanded production of consumer goods” and that “at an extraordinary party congress on October 6–10, 1989, the party renounced Marxism”. Political Handbook of the World (2015: 620) identifies Medgyessy’s ideology, writing that “A leftist government composed of the MSzP and the SzDSz took office under former Socialist finance minister Péter Medgyessy on May 27”. In the Global Party Survey 2019, 14 experts identify the average left-right (0-10) score of the Hungarian Socialist Party – Dialogue for Hungary (MSZP-PM) as 3.8. Döring and Manow (2019) identify MSzP’s party family as social democracy. In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify leader party’s ideology as “Center-left” (-1.112) in 2002.

Years: 2004-2008

Leader: Ferenc Gyurcsany

Ideology: left

Description: Description: Description: Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies party as MSzP. DPI identifies MSzP’s ideology as leftist. Armingeon et al. (2019) identifies MSzMP as leftist. Political Handbook of the World (2005-2006: 494), however, writes that “the 1962 congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (*Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt*—MSzMP) marked the beginning of a trend toward pragmatism in domestic policy that was exemplified by the implementation of a program known as the New Economic Mechanism, which allowed for decentralization, more flexible management strategies, incentives for efficiency, and expanded production of consumer goods” and that “at an extraordinary party congress on October 6–10, 1989, the party renounced Marxism”. Perspective Monde (2019) identifies Gyurcsany’s ideology as leftist. In the Global Party Survey 2019, 14 experts identify the average left-right (0-10) score of the Hungarian Socialist Party – Dialogue for Hungary (MSZP-PM) as 3.8. Döring and Manow (2019) identify MSzP’s party family as social democracy. In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify leader party’s ideology as “Center-left” (-1.112) in 2002 and “Center-left” (-0.538) in 2006..

Year: 2009

Leader: Gordon Bajnai

Ideology: left

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government. Political Handbook of the World (2015: 625) identifies Bajnai’s party as Together 2014. Boros (2013) identifies Together 2014 as leftist: “The movement’s objective was to unite the left-wing opposition and run Gordon Bajnai as prime ministerial candidate at the 2014 elections.” Döring and Manow (2019) identify Together’s party family as social democracy. In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify leader party’s ideology as “Center” (0.058) in 2014. In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify leader party’s cohesion as “Virtually no visible disagreement” in 2014. Reuters (2009) quotes Bajnai, ““The crisis management programme is based on the four targets of the immediate crisis management measures, of restoring economic balance, restarting economic growth and regaining confidence,” Bajnai told parliament.“I leave ideological debates for politicians as the crisis has no ideology and the forint, similarly, does not have a party,” Bajnai said.” Rauschenberger (2013) mentions that Bajnai formed a think tank in 2010, and that the papers which emerged, “outline a programme which is firmly grounded in facts and can be construed as left-liberal with its focus on issues such as employment, cohesion and mobility alongside narrower economic goals.”

Years: 2010-2020

Leader: Viktor Orban

Ideology: leftist

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government. Political Handbook of the World (2015: 623) identifies Orbán’s party as FiDeSz-MPSz – in full, Federation of Young Democrats–Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége–Magyar Polgari Szövetsëg). DPI identifies FiDeSz-MPSz as rightist. Political Handbook of the World does not provide any information on the party’s ideology. Perspective Monde (2019) identifies Orban’s ideology as rightist. In the Global Party Survey 2019, 14 experts identify the average left-right (0-10) score of Fidesz as 2.7. In the Global Party Survey 2019, 14 experts identify the average left-right (0-10) score of the Hungarian Socialist Party – Dialogue for Hungary (MSZP-PM) as 3.8. Norris (2020: 15) identifies Fidesz as leftist, writing that “parties using populist rhetoric fall across the economic spectrum, for example, Poland’s Law and Justice party (in common with many Eastern European populist parties) is socialist towards the economy and welfare state but highly traditional in its social values, for example towards Christianity, homosexuality and immigrants, alongside Bulgaria’s United Patriots and Hungary’s Fidesz”. Döring and Manow (2019) identify Fidesz-MPSz’s party family as conservative. Hass (2006: 566) writes that “In preparation for the 1994 elections, party leaders tried to re-create the party’s ideological platform, leading to a split between pro-market reformers (headed by Viktor Orban) and another group of reformers (headed by Gabor Fodor) who preferred a balance between market reforms and economic and social justice. After the split, in which Orban successfully gained control to define the party platform,” he “replaced the party’s initial liberal ideology with right-wing conservatism, more nationalism, and occasional Christian themes, tapping into the rising wave of right-wing nationalist sentiments that spread through segments of Eastern European populations toward the end of the 1990s.” Quoting *The Economist*, Jeffries (2002: 209) writes that “Viktor Orban, who seemed a thorough-going liberal until he took on a populist tinge in order to broaden his party’s appeal, has promised to slash taxes, bolster welfare and make the economy grow by 7 percent.” Djankov (2015: 8) writes that “Viktor Orbán, now in his third term, shares many features with Russian president Vladimir Putin. Both view the increasing role of the state as beneficial for their economies. And both consider the Western European economic model to be flawed.” Körösényi & Patkós (2017) write that “Both [Orban and Berlusconi] reject egalitarianism and the social welfare policies of the left, and their governments have contributed to some extent to reducing the welfare state. The middle class and the upper-middle class are the beneficiaries of their economic and social policies. Tax cuts, fighting unemployment and creating new jobs are among the top priorities of both leaders’ electoral programs. … Orbán condemns free market liberalism, globalized capitalism and multinational financial institutions. From 2010 onwards he promoted policy which gives a strong role to the state in the economy, including massive state ownership in sectors like energy, telecommunication and public utilities. In Orbán’s view, both individuals and the state are responsible for individual well-being. For instance, in employment policy he prefers community service to aid for the unemployed, but claims that it is the responsibility of the state to provide work for everybody (after 2010 the Orbán cabinet introduced a massive community service program). From 2010 onwards Orbán became a champion of a ‘workfare state’ and full employment instead of a welfare state, and he favors marked state intervention in the economy. … Orbán’s policy of strong state intervention in the economy aims at, among other things, replacing the post-communist elite and reinforcing the new counter-elite.” Deak (2014: 159-160) writes that “in the field of economy Orbán had an extremely high number of past populist promises … Accordingly, he excluded the words “austerity” and “reform” from the conservative economic vocabulary, and at least at the beginning of his period tried to do things differently. The basic pattern of Orbán’s economic mindset was neoconservative in redistribution issues: the introduction of an income tax rate (one the most unpopular measures according to opinion polls), liberalization of the labor market and tightening the eligibility to social benefits. … Despite some of these neoconservative features Fidesz has a good deal of statist and anti-capitalist attitudes. Its ambitions to take over the commanding heights of the economy are very strong. ... [Fidesz] wanted to create a national bourgeoisie and, in parallel fashion, nationalize most of these sectors or at least strengthen the presence of the state. is economic nationalism and statism was coupled with the strong belief in dirigisme, i.e. that the state can optimally develop the national economy and contribute to economic growth." In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify leader party’s ideology as “Center-right” (1.093) in 2010, and “Center-right” (1.295) in 2014. In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify leader party’s cohesion as “Virtually no visible disagreement” in 2010 and 2014. Funke et. Al (2020) code Orban as “right-wing populist,” although profile states, “[Orban’s] ethnic-cultural focus and the frequent attacks on foreign elites play a far bigger role in his discourse than economic grievances.” Ortiz de Zarate (2017) states, “Although [Orban] claimed to deny liberalism, he warned against the "excesses" and "insolidarity" of "savage capitalism", he demanded the shielding of public health from any private capitalization process and even requested the renationalization of certain already privatized companies,” or, “Aunque ahora decía renegar del liberalismo, advertía contra los "excesos" y la "insolidaridad" del "capitalismo salvaje", exigía el blindaje de la sanidad pública frente a todo proceso de capitalización privada y hasta solicitaba la renacionalización de ciertas empresas ya privatizadas.” DPI identifies FiDeSz-MPSz as rightist.

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